Polish-Jewish Relations: 1,300 Keyword-Phrase-Indexed Book Reviews (by Jan Peczkis)

Austria Between East and West 1945-1955, by William B. Bader. 1966. Stanford University Press, California

Austria Avoids Communism: Red Army Presence Did NOT Make Communist Rule Inevitable

Like Pilate, the Anglo-Americans washed their hands from their treaty obligations to Poland. One of the favorite excuses for the Yalta sellout of Poland was that it was just a bowing to “reality”. Given the presence of the Red Army on a geographic territory, we are told, Communist rule was unavoidable, and there was absolutely nothing that Churchill and Roosevelt could have done about it anyway (short of launching WWIII). As a corollary, Stalin was determined to impose Communism wherever his armies reached, and there was absolutely nothing that the Anglo-Americans could possibly have done to dissuade Stalin from his ambition. Nice excuses, but they do not add up.

Austria avoided Communism, despite her experience with the Red Army. This soundly demolishes the Anglo-American hand-washing over Poland. Let us take a closer look at it.

AUSTRIA AVOIDS COMMUNISM DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE RED ARMY

Consider the elections of December 1945. Despite the ubiquitous Red Army, there was no Soviet effort to force Communism on Austria, directly or indirectly. Bader writes, “The Viennese police were the key to control the city and perhaps ultimately of the country. Here, however, the Communists were most strongly entrenched; their position was backed not only by the Austrian Communist Party but, more important, by the Red Army. Furthermore, the Russians had unchallenged control of Eastern Austria. To press too hard would increase the growing fear that the Russians would seize on some pretext to split Eastern Austria away from the rest of the country.” (p. 85).

Now consider the elections of 1949. Bader comments, “The simplest answer would be that since a Communist success would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union and a failure would be a severe blow to its prestige, the Russians would go to whatever lengths were necessary to ensure success.” (pp. 157-158). Counterintuitively, this did not happen.

To continue, “Would a humiliating Communist defeat reflect so unfavorably on the Soviet Union that they would feel compelled to take action even though such action would necessarily involve open use of force–something the Russians had heretofore shied away from in Austria?” (p. 176). Yet that is exactly what happened, “Confronted with the dilemma of either allowing the Communist Party to suffer a crushing defeat or committing the Soviet troops necessary to stave off such a setback, the Russians backed off.” (p. 181).

The question is WHY, given the Yalta exculpatory line that Communism was a foregone conclusion because the Red Army was right there and Stalin was unbendable.  Clearly, Red Army presence did NOT make Communism inevitable, and Stalin COULD be induced to back off. The message is clear: Churchill and Roosevelt could have done more to oppose Stalin’s designs on Poland. So much for the Yalta-exculpatory myth.

AUSTRIA AVOIDS COMMUNISM AND THE RED ARMY VOLUNTARILY LEAVES AUSTRIA

Regarding May 1955, Bader asks, “…why did the Russians abandon Eastern Austria when they did…?…There have been few exercises in diplomacy that have levied more stringent demands on patience and endurance than the Austrian treaty negotiations.” (p. 187. Emphasis added).

So it all boils down the diplomacy. That’s quite an admission! It demolishes the foundations of the Yalta exculpations, and additionally raises the embarrassing question as to why negotiations worked for Austria but not for Poland. Did Churchill and Roosevelt truly try as hard to save Poland from Communism as they tried (and succeeded) in saving Austria? Or did the long line of unilateral Anglo-American concessions to Stalin, at Poland’s expense (such as the giveaway of the Kresy), give Stalin the idea that he could get away with almost anything regarding Poland, even if he felt that he could not quite get away with such things regarding Austria? Pointedly, were the Anglo-Americans more interested in saving Austria than they were in saving Poland?