Polish-Jewish Relations: 1,300 Keyword-Phrase-Indexed Book Reviews (by Jan Peczkis)

Narodowe Sily Zbrojne: Wspomnienia Osobiste, by S. “Bohdan” Zochowski. 1950

Some Early Combat Missions of the NSZ. Implications for the Killing of Fugitive Jews

NATIONAL ARMED FORCES: PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS is the title of this Polish-language article, originally published in KULTURA 5(31)100-126. Note that this is article was published shortly after WWII.

THE COMPOSITION AND NUMBERS OF THE NSZ

The NSZ (NSZ-SN and NSZ-ONR) came about from the union of previously-existing organizations, but especially the SN (Stronnictwo Narodowe) and, to a much lesser extent, the ONR (Oboz Narodowo Radykalne). The ONR component came from the former Zwiazek Jaszczurczy, which had been founded back in 1939. Zochowski affirms the fact that the ONR component of the NSZ (NSZ-ONR) was not large, but that its members tended to be selfless, resilient, ideological, and impetuous. (p. 105).

On October 1, 1943, the NSZ had 72,429 members. It consisted of 865 officers, 681 officer cadets, 5,941 noncommissioned officers, and 64,942 privates. There was a great shortage of arms and ammunition. (p. 110).

WHY NOT ALL NSZ EVENTUALLY JOINED THE AK

Part of the NSZ did not unite with the larger Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or A. K.).  It went far beyond petty political differences. It owed to the fact that the NSZ considered the Soviet Union as much an enemy of Poland as Nazi Germany, and often fought against Bolshevik bands. In contrast, the A. K. leadership sought a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union, and welcomed, into its ranks, even the part of the Bataliony Chlopskie (BCh) that was Communized. (p. 125).

THE NSZ FIGHTS THE PLAGUE OF BANDITRY: IMPLICATION FOR JEW-KILLING

By the second half of 1942, much of German-occupied eastern Poland, and even parts of the regions of Lublin and Warsaw, were lawless country. (p. 110). Bandit bands were everywhere, avoiding only the larger towns with their German garrisons and Blue Police (Policja Granatowa). To this was added fugitive Jews that had fled the ghettos, and especially the escaped Soviet POWs that the Germans had been treating so brutally. They robbed the peasants, who were defenseless. In some locations, even the Germans were afraid to go at night. (pp. 110-111).

The NSZ swung into action against the bandits and against the German gendarmes. To avoid reprisals, the NSZ misled the enemy by dressing in German or Soviet uniforms. There were plenty of Soviet uniforms, which the Polish peasants had bought from the Soviet POWs. (p. 111). The NSZ operation was a success. Many robber bands were liquidated, and so were some German gendarme and police units. (p. 112).

Although the author does not mention the alleged killings of fugitive Jews, of which nowadays Poles are reflexively blamed, the implications are obvious. How many Jews were killed by bandits or by escaped Soviet POWs? And how many Jews were killed by the NSZ, not because they were Jews, but because they had taken part in banditry?