Polish-Jewish Relations: 1,300 Keyword-Phrase-Indexed Book Reviews (by Jan Peczkis)

Year 1920, by Józef Piłsudski. 1972, 1924 [translation of Rok 1920]

Wilno. Bogus Border-Deciding Plebiscites. Wilno 1920 Polish “Seizure” a Myth. Poland Not the Aggressor in the 1920 Polish-Soviet War

This work, originally published in 1924 in Polish, is loaded with facts, tables, and maps. The latter are large-scale, foldout ones, showing the movements of Polish and Soviet troops in considerable detail. Pilsudski also provides a detailed rebuttal to the writings of Tukhachevski on the 1920 war. Many misconceptions related to the overall 1918-1920 period of Polish history are clarified.

THE PHONY PLEBISCITE THAT “SETTLED” THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE NEW POLISH STATE, AND GERMANY

The March 20, 1921 plebiscite that awarded Upper Silesia to Germany was bogus. The Germans had imported 180,000 Germans to vote. (They had been born there but did not currently live there). (p. 20). Later German propaganda, especially from the Nazi era onwards, portrayed the western powers as unduly harsh towards Germany and indulgent towards Poland. Such was far from the case. Part of Upper Silesia was given to Germany. Instead of being handed over to Poland completely, Danzig (Gdansk) became a free city. (p. 20).

THE MYTH ABOUT POLAND SEIZING WILNO/VILNA/VILNIUS

Zeligowski’s taking of Wilno (Vilna, Vilnius)(October 1920) has commonly been misrepresented as a unilateral grab for Poland. It was not. Wilno was taken as part of the plan that it would become part of some form of Polish-Lithuanian-Byelorussian federation. Only much later (March 1922), long after the federation plans had fallen through, and the Polish majority of Wilno/Vilnius demanded that this happen, was Wilno attached to the Polish state. (p. 18).

THOSE BIG, BAD POLISH LANDLORDS…AGAIN

Throughout 1918-1939, the period of Polish independence (and later against the Polish Government in Exile in London during WWII), Communist propaganda incessantly painted the Polish government as one composed of the wealthy and nobility. Actually, the peasant party (e. g., Witos and Daszynski) was the dominant force in at least the early Polish government of the Second Republic. (p. 202).

AGAINST THE ATTEMPTS TO BLAME POLAND FOR THE 1920 POLISH BOLSHEVIK WAR

The lull in the fighting following the Armistice that officially ended WWI (November 11, 1918) has fallaciously been taken as proof of the absence of a Soviet-Polish War, and twisted into the accusation that “Poland started it” in 1920. What actually caused the lull? Pilsudski explains that: “As the German withdrew, in mid-November [1918], Soviet troops started moving westwards in their wake…By the end of 1918, Soviet armies had occupied a considerable proportion of the territories of Lithuania and Byelorussia, and parts of Latvia and Estonia. At the time, Poland could not provide any effective counter-action to the advance of Soviet armies, as the Germans refused to let Polish troops cross the demarcation line in an easterly direction. The only resistance put up against the Russians came from…a spontaneous organization formed locally. In the face of overwhelming superiority of Soviet forces, these units were able to put up a fight lasting but a few days, and on the 5th January 1919, they were forced to pull out of Wilno.” (p. 23). Another cause of the 1919 lull in the fighting was the fact that both the Soviet and Polish armies were too weakened to systematically engage each other. (pp. 24-25).

A POLISH COUNTER-MOVE AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM

This Soviet aggression, however mostly unopposed, was intolerable to Poland. Pilsudski comments: “As for Poland, she could not look on impassively as Soviet troops occupied her eastern territories, which had a centuries-long tradition of common statehood with Poland, and whose inhabitants, in the great majority, were opposed to Communism, and just like other nationalities conquered by Russia, strove to achieve an independent existence.” (p. 25).

BEATING THE REDS TO THE PUNCH

Officially, “The Polish-Soviet War began in mid-February 1919″. (p. 24, 266). Pilsudski was well aware of the fact that, as soon as the Bolsheviks had regained their strength, they would attack Poland. It was for this reason that he launched his preemptive attack into the Soviet-ruled Ukraine. (p. 12, 14).

THE POLISH MOVE ON KIEV WAS IN NO SENSE A MANIFESTATION OF “POLISH IMPERIALISM”

Oddly enough, Pilsudski’s 1920 drive into the Ukraine has sometimes been misrepresented as a veiled “Polish imperialist” attempt to revive Poland in her pre-1772 boundaries. It was not. The protocol on which the Pilsudski-Petlura (Petlyura) alliance was based explicitly called for the withdrawal of Polish troops from any successfully-established independent Ukraine. (p. 14).