Polish-Jewish Relations: 1,300 Keyword-Phrase-Indexed Book Reviews (by Jan Peczkis)

Soviet Polish Relations, 1917-1921, by Piotr Stefan Wandycz. 1968, 2013

Very Low Rates of Polish Collaboration Demonstrated. Poland Not the Aggressor in the 1920 Polish-Bolshevik War

This work is overflowing with biographical and historical information. Owing to its comprehensiveness, I limit my review to a few issues.

THE EARLY ZYDOKOMUNA

Among revolutionary political parties, consider the SDKPiL. Some authors try to cast it in a positive light. However, Wandycz points out that SDKPiL joined the Bolsheviks before the October Revolution. (p. 52). So, obviously the Zydokomuna was much broader than just the card-carrying Communists.

HOW LARGE SHOULD POLAND BE?

Now consider the different visions for the eastern border of a resurrected Polish state. (See map, p. 95). The National Democrats (Endeks) promoted what has been considered the nationalist, incorporationist, annexationist, or even imperialist orientation. They wanted Poland to incorporate Lithuania, and to extend somewhat further east of what became the eventual Riga border. Their view was hardly annexationist or imperialist, as they wanted only those territories with a substantial Polish population, economic interests, etc. Pointedly, the so-called Dmowski line not only eschewed the borders of 1772, but also rejected all of the territories that Poland had lost in the first partition, along with much of the territory lost in the second partition. (p. 96). Imperialist indeed!

In contrast, the federalist position, favored by Pilsudski, enjoyed the support of a wide assortment of Polish liberals, conservatives, socialists, populists, and intellectuals (various examples listed by Wandycz). It proposed the resurrection of the Commonwealth of Poland, but as a federation of nations, comprising Poland, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, and possibly the other Baltic countries. (p. 96). As for the eastern border of Poland itself, Pilsudski, as a first step, favored it going through a line connecting Wilno, Baranowicze, Pinsk, Kowel, Lwow, and Drohobycz. (p. 99).

The eastern border that emerged because of the Treaty of Riga was a compromise between the ideas of Dmowski and those of Pilsudski. Whatever the “injustice” of leaving millions of non-Poles west of the border, one must also remember the “injustice” of 3 million Poles, still left in the Soviet Union, east of the Riga border. (p. 84).

THE 1920 POLISH-SOVIET WAR: IMPLICATIONS

The author focuses on both the military and political issues in this pivotal conflict. Much was in a state of flux.

Wandycz takes issue with those who assert that Poland was the aggressor in the 1920 War. He cites both a Communist and non-Communist author who agree that both Poland and the USSR had prepared for the showdown that took place in 1920. (p. 387). The Red Army had begun its advance in 1918-1919, and Poland’s fate became obvious to Poland’s leaders. (p. 289).

What would have happened if Poland had lost the 1920 Bolshevik War? The USSR could either have made Poland into a satellite nation (as she was to do in 1944), or absorb Poland as a Soviet Republic. (p. 177, 285). There is also evidence that Lenin opposed the provisions of the Versailles accords in regards to the Polish-German situation, and this could have implied a renewed partition of Poland. (p. 285).

JEWS SERVE AS TOOLS OF THE SOVIETS

The author does not get into the subject of Jewish-Soviet collaboration (sometimes called the Zydokomuna) during the 1920 Polish-Soviet War. However, he mentions the Soviet occupation of Bialystok, during which time the commissars gave school positions to trusted Jews, while the Polish students were reduced to a minority. (p. 227).

VERY LOW RATES OF POLISH COLLABORATION, EVEN WHEN UNDER DURESS

Piotr S. Wandycz then focuses on the almost complete failure of the Soviets, during their 1920 occupation of Poland, to gain any significant support among local working class Poles. Based on Soviet documents, the Communist indoctrination of 24,000 Polish POWS induced only 123 of them to agree to join the Bolshevik Party. (p. 230). This comes out to a vanishing one-half of one percent! [Later, in 1940, the Soviet found only 15 captive Polish officers, out of many thousands, expressing sympathy towards Communism. Please see: Deportation and Exile: Poles in the Soviet Union, 1939-48, and read the detailed Peczkis review.]